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@POTUS: Rethinking Presidential 
Immunity in the Time of Twitter 
DOUGLAS B. MCKECHNIE* 
President Donald Trump’s use of Twitter portends a 
turning point in presidential communication. His Tweets an-
imate his base and enrage his opponents. Tweets, however, 
like any form of communication, can ruin reputations. In 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court determined that a 
president retains absolute immunity for all actions that fall 
within the “outer perimeter” of his official duties. This Arti-
cle explores the “outer perimeter” of presidential immunity. 
It suggests the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments in-
form the demarcation of the “outer perimeter,” and that 
when a president engages in malicious defamation, his 
speech falls outside this perimeter and is not protected by 
presidential immunity.  
The Article begins by examining Twitter as a social me-
dia platform and how it facilitates and affects the way we 
communicate. It then focuses on how Presidents Barack 
Obama and Donald Trump incorporated the use of Twitter 
into their presidencies. I then explore four distinct lines of 
jurisprudence that I argue inform how to identify the “outer 
perimeter” of a president’s official duties: (1) presidential 
immunity; (2) immunity for executive branch officials; (3) 
                                                                                                             
* Professor McKechnie is an Associate Professor in the Department of Law at the 
United States Air Force Academy. He earned his J.D. from the University of Pitts-
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herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or 
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the constitutional implications of defamation; and (4) the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ prohibition on govern-
ment action motivated by animus. I posit that considering 
these four doctrines, along with the method and manner of 
communication facilitated by Twitter, malicious defamation 
falls outside the “outer perimeter” of official presidential 
duties, and thus, presidential immunity is inapplicable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Never before has the President of the United States had access 
to—and so routinely used—an immediate, unfiltered, and pervasive 
media platform to communicate directly with the world.1 President 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Morning Edition: White House Communications Strategy Critiqued by 
Former Obama Official, NPR (Feb. 13, 2017, 5:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2017/02/13/514935085/trump-administration-s-communication-strategy-cri-
tiqued-by-former-obama-official [hereinafter NPR’s Morning Edition]. 
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Donald Trump’s use of Twitter has broken the mold.2 Within this 
new paradigm, a President can communicate his thoughts at any 
time, on any subject, without the vetting process traditionally used 
by, to one degree or another, other modern Presidents.3 While some 
laud this as a positive hallmark, it also poses risks that the vetting 
process can reduce or eliminate.4 With a President actively partici-
pating in the instantaneous communication social media allows, that 
prophylactic process evaporates and a President’s message of the 
moment is delivered in raw terms.5 Raw language, however, can 
lead to liability.6 
In the past, if a President was drafting remarks to be delivered 
through traditional mediums and the remarks referred disparagingly 
to a particular individual, defamatory language undoubtedly would 
be stricken or wordsmithed so the message was delivered without 
directly maligning the person’s reputation.7 However, as vetting 
goes, so goes wordsmithing.8 In the age of Twitter, those disparag-
ing words that would have otherwise ended up on the cutting room 
floor may now find themselves contained within a 140-character 
message9 delivered by, and directly attributable to, the President of 
the United States.10 The individual who draws the ire of a President 
may now find himself defamed, with reputational injuries resulting 
from the President’s unadulterated words.11 
                                                                                                             
 2 Compare Philip Bump, You’re Not Really Following @BarackObama on 
Twitter, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2013/04/youre-not-following-barackobama-twitter/316523/ (creating an Obama 
Twitter account for the campaign staff to communicate with followers) with 
Trump on Twitter: A History of the Man and His Medium, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38245530 [hereinafter Trump 
on Twitter] (preferring to directly tweet about issues like foreign policy from his 
personal twitter account in lieu of press conferences). 
 3 NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See infra Part II. 
 7 See NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1. 
 8 See id. 
 9 “Tweet (n.): A Tweet may contain photos, videos, links and up to 140 char-
acters of text.” The Twitter Glossary | Twitter Help Center, TWITTER, https://sup-
port.twitter.com/articles/166337 (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) [hereinafter The 
Twitter Glossary]. 
 10 See NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1. 
 11 See Trump on Twitter, supra note 2. 
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While textually absent from the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
has determined that a President retains absolute immunity when he 
“acts within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official” duties.12 Therefore, 
one would expect a defamation claim against a President to be met 
with an absolute immunity defense.13 However, where a President’s 
defamatory statements are motivated by malice, the absolute im-
munity defense is unavailable.14 The Supreme Court has determined 
that in other constitutional contexts, such as the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, where the government is inspired by animus—mal-
ice’s equivalent—its activities fall outside the boundaries of consti-
tutionally permissible government action.15 Those actions are void 
as the Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in offi-
cial actions for merely malicious reasons.16 If the Constitution pro-
scribes maliciously motivated government actions,17 then mali-
ciously motivated defamation likewise falls outside the “outer pe-
rimeter” of official acts constitutionally available to a President.18 
As a result, malicious defamation cannot be included within the of-
ficial duties of a President, and presidential immunity vanishes. 
Furthermore, when the Constitution’s prohibitions on malicious 
government actions19 are coupled with the First Amendment under-
standing of malicious defamation,20 the “outer perimeter” of presi-
dential duties is clearer and a presidential immunity claim becomes 
even more untenable.21 The United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that in the interests of democracy and to ensure a robust and 
open dialogue about public officials, the First Amendment protects 
                                                                                                             
 12 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982). 
 13 See id. at 755–56. 
 14 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (stating that when state 
government actions are motived by “animus,” they are constitutionally impermis-
sible under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 15 See id.; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693, 2695–96 
(2013) (holding a statute invalid as the law served no legitimate purpose and was 
used to ensure same-sex marriages “will be treated as second-class marriages”). 
 16 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. 
 17 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. 
 18 Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982) (concluding that the 
President’s alleged wrongful act is “well within the outer perimeter of his author-
ity” when it is made within his “constitutional and statutory authority”). 
 19 See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 at 631–32. 
 20 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 21 See id. at 282. 
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a significant amount of speech that might otherwise constitute defa-
mation.22 Yet, no matter how generous the latitude is under the First 
Amendment, malicious defamation still falls outside the boundaries 
of protected speech.23 Thus, the Constitution’s intolerance of gov-
ernment actions that are motivated by malice, taken together with its 
placement of malicious defamation beyond First Amendment pro-
tection, evinces a constitutional preclusion of presidential immunity 
where a President’s defamation is motivated by malice.24 
This article has three parts. Part I explores the developing zone 
where Twitter and the presidency of the United States converge. It 
begins with an overview of how Twitter functions and how it en-
courages a hitherto unavailable form of communication with its own 
distinctive method and style.25 It then chronicles how Presidents 
Obama and Trump, the only Presidents to have used Twitter,26 have 
incorporated it into their lives and the presidency. Part II explores 
four distinct, but relevant, constitutional doctrines: (1) presidential 
immunity, (2) immunity for executive branch officials, (3) the con-
stitutional implications of defamation, and (4) the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments’ prohibition on government action motivated 
by animus. Part III argues that, when considering these four doc-
trines, it becomes clear that if a President engages in malicious def-
amation, then that speech is outside the constitutionally permissible 
actions available to a President. Therefore, presidential immunity 
would not be an available defense, especially in the time of Twitter. 
I. TWITTER AND THE PRESIDENCY 
A. Twitter: A Window Into the Soul 
Twitter is a public, Internet-based platform that allows users to 
post asynchronous messages, or tweets, that are 140 characters 
long.27 Tweets require comparatively little time to draft and can be 
posted by way of a mobile phone, computer, tablet, or virtually any 
                                                                                                             
 22 Id. at 269–70. 
 23 See id. 279–80. 
 24 See id. at 282. 
 25 See generally DHIRAJ MURTHY, TWITTER: SOCIAL COMMUNICATION IN 
THE TWITTER AGE 1–3 (2013). 
 26 See NPR’s Morning Edition, supra note 1. 
 27 MURTHY, supra note 25, at 1–2. 
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device connected to the Internet.28 Although tweets can be restricted 
to a limited group of people with private access to a user’s account, 
tweets are typically accessible by the general public, unlike posts on 
social networking sites like Facebook.29 Tweets can refer to, and be 
directed at, other Twitter users, thus allowing Twitter users to inter-
act with each other regardless of a preexisting relationship or other-
wise being acquainted.30 Though it is an available option, Twitter is 
less a means by which to carry on bidirectional communication and 
more a means to link the tweets of strangers so as to contribute to a 
larger discussion.31 
Twitter users are identified by their username preceded by the 
@ symbol.32 A Twitter user’s tweet can reference any other user, 
whether or not the users know each other, by simply adding the @ 
symbol as a prefix to a username.33 By using the # symbol, or 
hashtag, in a tweet, tweets on a particular topic are aggregated.34 As 
a result, if a user clicks on a word or phrase preceded by a # symbol, 
he will see a list of tweets containing the same word or phrase.35 As 
of August 12, 2017, Twitter had approximately 328,000,000 active 
monthly users, and of those users, 80% of them accessed Twitter 
through a mobile device.36 
Unlike social networking sites that emphasize connecting with 
and sustaining personal relationships, Twitter is a social media plat-
form.37 It promotes the buildup of an audience, or followers, and 
facilitates the airing of one’s thoughts to the audience in the form of 
tweets.38 With limited space for posts, Twitter is considered a mi-
croblog most often used to capture and articulate one’s thoughts of 
                                                                                                             
 28 Id. at 3. 
 29 Id. at 2. 
 30 Id. at 3. 
 31 Id. at 3–4. 
 32 The Twitter Glossary, supra note 9. 
 33 See id. 
 34 MURTHY, supra note 25, at 3. 
 35 The Twitter Glossary, supra note 9. 
 36 Salman Aslam, Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics & Fun 
Facts, OMNICORE (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-sta-
tistics/ (noting the percentage of Twitter users on a mobile device was last updated 
on Jan. 24, 2017). 
 37 MURTHY, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 38 Id. at 8. 
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the moment or “quick reflections” as opposed to “coherent state-
ments and discourse.”39 Twitter, like other microblogs, relies on its 
members’ regular contributions.40 Indeed, it is this regularity and 
repetition that can cause a loss of inhibition regarding what a user 
reveals.41 It becomes second nature to retrieve one’s mobile device, 
access Twitter, and “quasi-unconsciously” share intimate thoughts 
and details with the world.42 
These revelations, and other types of self-disclosure, are not the 
only results of repetition. Sharing information about oneself on plat-
forms like Twitter activates the same pleasure region of the brain as 
food and sex.43 It is this biological reaction that creates a “reciprocal 
cyclical feedback,” encouraging continued sharing of information.44 
The impulsive, reckless self-disclosure fuels instant gratification 
and can be repeated on demand.45 Additionally, reticence to share 
otherwise private thoughts is eroded on Twitter because of the lack 
of visual cues that humans usually rely on to discourage overshar-
ing.46 This lack of visual cues also creates a disembodied aspect to 
the communication and allows a user to more easily disassociate 
himself from his actions, whether banal, malicious, or profound.47 
B. Presidential Use of Twitter 
President Barack Obama’s personal Twitter account, 
@BarackObama, was created by a campaign worker on March 5, 
2007, two months before he announced his candidacy.48 His cam-
paign continued to run the account from 2007 through the 2008 pres-
idential campaign, into his first term as President, and throughout 
his 2012 presidential campaign.49 While he occasionally signed 
tweets from the @BarackObama account with his initials “-bo” to 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. at 8–9. 
 40 See id. at 10–11. 
 41 Id. at 10. 
 42 Id. at 134–35. 
 43 See SUSAN GREENFIELD, MIND CHANGE: HOW DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES 
ARE LEAVING THEIR MARK ON OUR BRAINS 103 (2015). 
 44 Id. 
 45 See id. at 103, 267. 
 46 See id. at 104. 
 47 See id. at 146. 
 48 Bump, supra note 2. 
 49 Id. 
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indicate it was he who posted the tweet, his campaign staff was most 
often responsible for the tweets.50 The tweets from the @BarackO-
bama account dealt primarily with policy priorities and motivating 
followers to support the President’s efforts.51 In January 2013, con-
trol of the @BarackObama account was transferred from the Presi-
dent’s campaign staff to Organizing for Action, a political non-profit 
engaged in advocacy issues.52 
In addition to his occasional personal tweets from @BarackO-
bama, President Obama sometimes signed tweets from the official 
White House account, @WhiteHouse.53 On May 18, 2015, President 
Obama posted the first official presidential tweet from the presiden-
tial Twitter handle, @POTUS.54 When @POTUS was created, the 
intent was that the Twitter handle would remain the official Twitter 
account of the President of the United States, and the next President 
would take over the account.55 On January 20, 2017, after the inau-
guration of President Donald Trump, former President Obama re-
turned to @BarackObama and now tweets from that account.56 
Unlike President Obama, President Trump had a significant 
presence on Twitter as a private citizen before being elected Presi-
dent and taking control of the @POTUS account.57 Donald Trump 
created his personal @realDonaldTrump account in May 2009, 
seven years before being elected President.58 In the first few years, 
Donald Trump shared responsibility for his @realDonaldTrump ac-
count with his staff; tweets he wrote himself included “from Donald 
                                                                                                             
 50 Id.; Roberta Rampton, Obama Gets His Own Account on Twitter: ‘It’s 
Barack. Really!’, REUTERS (May 18, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/usa-obama-twitter-idUSL1N0Y915O20150518. 
 51 Bump, supra note 2. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Rampton, supra note 50. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Brooke Seipel, Obama Returns to Personal Twitter: ‘Is This Thing Still 
on?’, THE HILL (Jan. 20, 2017, 4:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/in-
the-know/315363-obama-returns-to-personal-twitter-is-this-thing-still-on. 
 57 See generally Trump on Twitter, supra note 2. 
 58 Id. Because the @DonaldTrump Twitter account had been created as a par-
ody account, President Trump’s name is preceded by the word “real.” Id. 
2017] @POTUS: PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IN THE TIME OF TWITTER 9 
 
Trump” in the message.59 Initially, his tweets pertained to his tele-
vision show, his public appearances, and his family—not politics.60 
In 2011, “from Donald Trump” stopped appearing in tweets 
from the @realDonaldTrump account, which made it unclear 
whether he or his staff drafted the tweets.61 At this same time, Don-
ald Trump’s tweets became more political and more numerous.62 
For example, in July 2011, with fewer than 2,000,000 followers, 
Donald Trump tweeted about the relationship between China and 
the United States.63 He suggested China was the United States’ en-
emy and was bent on destroying it.64 In May that same year, he made 
his first reference to running for President.65 While he had only 
tweeted around 275 times in the two-year period from May 2009 to 
May 2011, in the last six months of 2011 he tweeted over 550 
times.66 By 2016, Donald Trump was tweeting, on average, 375 
times a month and had approximately 12,000,000 followers.67 
On June 16, 2015, Donald Trump announced his candidacy for 
President of the United States.68 He continued to use his @real-
DonaldTrump account throughout the campaign to comment on a 
variety of issues, including Macy’s department store’s decision to 
discontinue selling his fashion line, presidential debate perfor-
mances, and his political adversaries.69 Regarding his political ad-
versaries, he referred to them as “weak,” “failed,” “nasty,” dumb,” 
“wacko,” “light weight,” dopey,” and “crazy.”70 After his election, 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.; David Lazer et al., I. You. Great. Trump.*, POLITICO (May/June 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/gallery/2016/04/donald-trump-twitter-ac-
count-history-social-media-campaign-000631?slide=0. 
 63 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 20, 2011, 1:10 
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/93774719052029953; Trump on 
Twitter, supra note 2. 
 64 Trump, supra note 63. 
 65 Lazer et al., supra note 62. 
 66 See Trump on Twitter, supra note 2. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Lazer et al., supra note 62; Andrew McGill, What Trump Tweets While 
America Sleeps, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/10/what-trump-tweets-while-america-sleeps/503141. 
 70 Lazer et al., supra note 62. 
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but before his inauguration, President-elect Trump continued to 
tweet from his @realDonaldTrump account on a range of issues, in-
cluding the media, his cabinet selections, and foreign and domestic 
policy.71 
President Trump assumed control of the @POTUS Twitter ac-
count on January 20, 2017, and now operates two Twitter accounts 
simultaneously—@POTUS and @realDonaldTrump.72 As an indi-
cator that he has personally drafted a tweet posted by the @POTUS 
account, the initials “-DJT” are included with the tweet.73 Tweets 
are posted from both of these accounts daily and, at times, within 
hours or minutes of each other.74 For example, on February 6, 2017, 
at 11:32 a.m., he tweeted the following from @realDonaldTrump: 
“The failing @nytimes writes total fiction concerning me. They 
have gotten it wrong for two years, and now are making up stories 
& sources!”75 An hour later at 12:38 p.m., he tweeted the following 
from @POTUS: “Will be interviewed on @oreillyfactor tonight at 
8:00 P.M. Enjoy! –DJT . . . .”76 
Since taking control of these two accounts, President Trump 
tweets on a range of issues from both accounts.77 He has tweeted 
about the media, his family, his choice for the Supreme Court, his 
travel plans, his meetings with foreign heads of state, intelligence 
leaks, his cabinet, his critics, and foreign and domestic policy.78 The 
way in which President Trump communicates via Twitter ranges 
from insulting to complimentary and from unabashed to measured. 
It is his brash tweets, however, that have garnered the most attention. 
For example, on January 26, 2017, he tweeted from @real-
DonaldTrump about the of release of Chelsea Manning from prison 
and wrote: “Ungrateful TRAITOR Chelsea Manning, who should 
never have been released from prison, is now calling President 
                                                                                                             
 71 Amanda Wills & Alysha Love, All the President’s Tweets, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/trump-tweets (last updated Sept. 
27, 2017, 3:11 PM). 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
2017] @POTUS: PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IN THE TIME OF TWITTER 11 
 
Obama a weak leader. Terrible!”79 On February 4, 2017, in response 
to a District Court judge’s decision to issue a Temporary Restraining 
Order and stop the implementation of his Executive Order on immi-
gration, he tweeted from @realDonaldTrump: “The opinion of this 
so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement away from 
our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!”80 
Perhaps, however, his tweets about President Obama have 
caused the most controversy. On March 4, 2017, at 6:35 a.m., Pres-
ident Trump, tweeting from his @realDonaldTrump account, wrote: 
“Terrible! Just found out that Obama had my ‘wires tapped’ in 
Trump Tower just before the victory. Nothing found. This is McCar-
thyism!”81 At 6:49 a.m., he tweeted from the same account: “Is it 
legal for a sitting President to be ‘wire tapping’ a race for President 
prior to an election? Turned down by court earlier. A NEW 
LOW!”82 Three minutes later, at 6:52 a.m., he wrote: “I’d bet a good 
lawyer could make a great case out of the fact that President Obama 
was tapping my phones in October, just prior to Election!”83 Ten 
minutes later, at 7:02 a.m., he wrote: “How low has President 
Obama gone to tapp [sic] my phones during the very sacred election 
process. This is Nixon/Watergate. Bad (or sick) guy!”84 
Undoubtedly, it could be a crime if President Obama ordered an 
intelligence agency to wiretap President Trump during the presiden-
tial campaign after having failed to obtain a warrant or order from 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. However, if President 
Obama did no such thing, then President Trump’s allegations that 
President Obama criminally misused intelligence-gathering tech-
niques could have a harmful effect on President Obama’s reputation. 
While the story is still unfolding at the time of this writing, when 
testifying before the House Intelligence Committee, the former Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated he had no infor-
mation that supported the veracity of President Trump’s tweets.85 
                                                                                                             
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Matt Apuzzo et al., F.B.I. Is Investigating Trump’s Russia Ties, Comey 
Confirms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/us/
politics/fbi-investigation-trump-russia-comey.html. 
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II. THE DISPARATE, RELEVANT DOCTRINES: ABSOLUTE 
IMMUNITY, DEFAMATION, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS  
A. Presidential Immunity 
No exploration of presidential immunity would be complete 
without a discussion of the first Supreme Court case considering the 
issue—Nixon v. Fitzgerald.86 In Nixon, a U.S. Air Force civilian em-
ployee, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, appeared in front of a congressional 
oversight committee to provide testimony regarding cost overruns 
on a transport airplane.87 Mr. Fitzgerald’s testimony reportedly pro-
vided embarrassing information about his supervisors and their in-
eptitude.88 Two years later, under a new presidential administration, 
Mr. Fitzgerald’s position was eliminated as part “of a departmental 
reorganization and reduction in force.”89 While President Richard 
Nixon and his administration considered reassigning Mr. Fitzgerald 
to a different federal agency, in the end, he failed to obtain another 
position.90 Mr. Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commis-
sion and alleged his separation from federal employment constituted 
retaliation for his congressional testimony.91 
At the Commission’s hearing, the Secretary of the Air Force in-
voked executive privilege to avoid answering certain questions.92 
Five days later, when asked at a news conference about Mr. Fitzger-
ald’s separation, President Nixon took full responsibility for the de-
cision.93 The next day, the White House retracted the President’s 
statement and suggested that President Nixon had confused Mr. 
Fitzgerald with another employee.94 Ultimately, the Civil Service 
Commission concluded that Mr. Fitzgerald’s termination had been 
a result of his supervisor’s dissatisfaction with his performance and 
not being a team player.95 Mr. Fitzgerald filed suit and, after some 
procedural hurdles and discovery, included the President of the 
                                                                                                             
 86 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 87 Id. at 733–34. 
 88 Id. at 734. 
 89 Id. at 733. 
 90 Id. at 735–36. 
 91 Id. at 736. 
 92 Id. at 737. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 738 n.16. 
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United States as a defendant.96 The President claimed absolute im-
munity, which the District Court and Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia rejected.97 
As this was a case of first impression, the Supreme Court began 
its analysis of President Nixon’s absolute immunity claim by sur-
veying the jurisprudential landscape of immunity for government 
officials.98 Nearly 100 years before President Nixon invoked presi-
dential immunity, the Court considered the Postmaster General’s 
claim of immunity from civil liability in Spalding v. Vilas and held 
that “public policy and convenience” compelled recognition of im-
munity for suits arising from official acts.99 In Spalding, the Court 
reasoned that failure to recognize such immunity would cause exec-
utive officials to be apprehensive in exercising their discretion for 
fear of civil liability, particularly when time called for bold action.100 
In other words, when acting in his capacity as a chief executive, and 
within the limits of his authority, the head of a governmental agency 
should not be in fear that the motivation behind his actions will be 
the subject of a lawsuit.101 
The Court continued a review of its case law by noting similar 
reasons for recognizing absolute immunity for judges’ actions taken 
in furtherance of their judicial responsibilities.102 The Court also 
pointed out its previous recognition of a qualified “good faith” im-
munity for police officers and state executive officials for actions 
taken in furtherance of their respective professional responsibili-
ties.103 Nonetheless, the Court rejected the argument that, like 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. at 739–40. 
 97 Id. at 740–41. 
 98 Id. at 744–45. 
 99 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). The Nixon Court noted that 
its earliest recognition of immunity defense drew upon English common law’s 
recognition of the defense. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744. 
 100 Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744–45. 
 101 Id. at 745. 
 102 Id. at 745–46. 
 103 Id. at 746. 
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judges, all federal executive officials possessed absolute immun-
ity.104 Judges require absolute immunity “because of the special na-
ture of their responsibilities.”105 However, the Court’s previous case 
law had specifically left open the question of whether some federal 
officials might be entitled to absolute immunity for public policy 
reasons.106 The question for the Court, therefore, was whether the 
President was the sort of federal official entitled to absolute immun-
ity.107 
The Court held that the President of the United States is indeed 
entitled to absolute immunity for civil damages arising out of offi-
cial acts.108 The Court reasoned that, when taking into account the 
constitutional structure, separation of powers, and the nature of the 
President’s office, the President is uniquely situated such that abso-
lute immunity is required.109 The President’s Article II powers are 
action-oriented—enforcing law, conducting foreign affairs, manag-
ing the executive branch—and thus, absolute immunity is a must 
when the President is acting within his official capacity.110 Absolute 
immunity frees the President and provides the maximum space to 
operate without fear of liability.111 This is particularly so, as the 
President often finds himself navigating issues where feelings run 
high.112 The visibility of the office and the effects of presidential 
actions on countless people necessitate absolute immunity because 
the execution of presidential duties must be unencumbered from fear 
of lawsuits.113 
The Court placed some limitations, however slight, on this ab-
solute immunity.114 Absolute immunity was not to be a magical in-
cantation that would mechanically bar any lawsuit.115 Recognizing 
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that absolute immunity traditionally only extended to acts in further-
ance of an official’s duties, the Court extended the President’s ab-
solute immunity to those acts within the “outer perimeter” of his of-
ficial duties.116 Undoubtedly, this was both an intentional and com-
paratively expansive grant of immunity; however, such immunity 
was not without its limits. Actions falling outside of the “outer pe-
rimeter” of his official responsibilities would not retain the absolute 
immunity shield.117 Ultimately, after applying this standard to the 
allegations against President Nixon, the Court wasted no time in 
holding that his actions regarding Mr. Fitzgerald’s employment fell 
within his authority and were thus entitled to absolute immunity.118 
Fifteen years later, the Court addressed a “temporary” presiden-
tial immunity claim by President William J. Clinton in a lawsuit over 
allegedly tortious actions that took place before he became Presi-
dent.119 President Clinton argued that this temporary immunity pro-
hibited civil litigation during the course of a President’s term and 
extended to all but the most exceptional cases—even requiring tem-
porary immunity for unofficial, pre-presidency acts.120 The Court 
revisited its rationale from Nixon and the benefits of absolute presi-
dential immunity.121 
The Court reiterated its commitment to absolute presidential im-
munity for official acts because of the liberating effect it has on the 
President.122 The public good is served, the Court restated, when a 
President is free to take action in his official capacity without the 
constant threat of liability for his decisions.123 However, because 
“the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the im-
munity’s justifying purposes,” immunity from unofficial actions 
fails to serve that same public good.124 Thus, though the President’s 
absolute immunity extends to the “outer perimeter of his authority,” 
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it does not extend to those acts unrelated to the particular functions 
of his office.125 
B. Defamation and Immunity for Government Officials 
The absolute immunity doctrine articulated in Nixon and Clinton 
stemmed from claims for wrongful termination against President 
Nixon while he was in office and for various torts that allegedly oc-
curred before President Clinton was elected.126 Neither case consid-
ered a claim for defamation against a sitting President. Nevertheless, 
the Court has spoken on the question of immunity for actions by 
federal executive branch employees.127 Indeed, nearly twenty-five 
years before the Court was first asked to consider the question of 
presidential immunity, it explored similar immunity claims in the 
context of alleged defamation by a government official.128 
In Barr v. Matteo, former federal employees sued a government 
agency and its director for defamation.129 The employees alleged 
that the director, after being derided by Senators in the press, issued 
a press release wrongly blaming them for implementing a policy that 
resulted in mismanagement of government resources.130 Moreover, 
the employees claimed the director had issued the allegedly untrue 
press release with malice.131 The director claimed that, as a govern-
ment official, he was entitled to absolute privilege or immunity, 
which barred the employees’ malicious defamation claim.132 
Recognizing that immunity for executive branch officials is a 
judicial construct, unlike the Constitution’s specific immunity for 
members of Congress, the Court set out to explore the boundaries of 
a government official’s absolute immunity defense for a claim of 
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malicious defamation.133 Like in Nixon, the Court relied on the Post-
master General’s immunity claim in Spalding v. Vilas where the 
Postmaster General allegedly disseminated maliciously false infor-
mation to harm the business prospects of an attorney.134 The Court 
quoted, with agreement, the Spalding Court’s rationale, which rec-
ognized an interest in protecting government officials from the trep-
idation that would imbue their official actions if their motives could 
be the subject of a suit for liability.135 That trepidation, the Court 
reasoned, would only tend to inhibit the official’s performance of 
his duties and thus impede a well-functioning government.136 
As noted in Nixon and Clinton, this immunity is not without lim-
itations.137 It applies to only those acts that are within the scope of 
the official’s duties.138 Although one might argue the aim of official 
duties can only be to further the public good, thus barring immunity 
if an official’s actions are not intended to do so, the Court suggested 
the question is simpler than that.139 The question is only whether 
“the occasion . . . would have justified the act, if [the official] had 
been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it 
was vested in him . . . .”140 As the government official’s position and 
duties increase, so increases the privilege and the acts protected.141 
Applying its reasoning to the employees’ defamation claim, the 
Court held that, while it was a close call, the director’s press release 
was within his duties and thus shielded by immunity.142 As an acting 
director, he had the discretion to use the means at his disposal to 
respond publicly to accusations of mismanagement.143 It was of no 
consequence that the director was not legally required to issue a 
press release.144 Press releases are a standard practice often used by 
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agency directors to communicate with the public to ensure a gov-
ernmental agency functions effectively.145 What is more, the em-
ployees’ allegations of malice had no effect on the Court’s applica-
tion of the privilege.146 Certainly, injuries may go without a remedy; 
but, on balance, the public good is more effectively served by en-
suring the government official is not constantly looking over his 
shoulder.147 On this point, Chief Justice Warren disagreed.148 
Chief Justice Warren posited in his dissent that the interests to 
be balanced go beyond the singular wrong inflicted on the defama-
tion victim.149 In addition to the public interest in limiting defama-
tion claims so a government official feels uninhibited, there is a pub-
lic interest in ensuring citizens feel free to criticize government of-
ficials without fear of “being subjected to unfair—and absolutely 
privileged—retorts.”150 The absolute immunity provided to govern-
ment officials in defamation cases will only serve to chill the speech 
of those who would criticize them.151 Why rail against a public of-
ficial if your criticism can be met with privileged defamation?152 
Absolute immunity as applied to defamation claims protects the 
powerful, silences the powerless, and limits open discussion.153 And 
this, Chief Justice Warren argued, “is a much more serious danger 
than the possibility that a government official” may be forced to lit-
igate a claim for malicious defamation.154 
C. The First Amendment Implications of Defamation 
While the absolute immunity doctrine ostensibly applies to any 
presidential act that falls within the “outer perimeter” of presidential 
responsibilities, some presidential acts necessarily implicate other 
constitutional principles.155 For example, a President’s Article II 
role as Commander-in-Chief is not a self-contained constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 145 Id. at 574. 
 146 Id. at 575. 
 147 Id. at 576. 
 148 Id. at 584 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 585. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 694 (1977). 
2017] @POTUS: PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY IN THE TIME OF TWITTER 19 
 
authority.156 A President’s Commander-in-Chief power is influ-
enced by, and must be considered in light of, Congress’s Article I 
authority to declare war.157 Similarly, communicating is not a self-
contained presidential act. A President’s power to speak is influ-
enced by, and must be considered in light of, the First Amend-
ment.158 In particular, defamatory speech occupies a unique position 
within First Amendment jurisprudence, and that jurisprudence in-
fluences the realm of protected speech, including presidential 
speech.159 Such jurisprudence shapes and illuminates the “outer pe-
rimeter” of presidential duties.160 
Though recognized as a common law tort, and “never” consid-
ered protected speech,161 defamation took on a constitutional dimen-
sion in New York Times v. Sullivan.162 In Sullivan, a public official 
sued a group of civil rights activists and the New York Times.163 
The civil rights activists ran an advertisement in the New York 
Times alleging an abusive and violent course of conduct directed at 
civil rights activists by the police in Montgomery, Alabama.164 Sul-
livan, the plaintiff, alleged that the statements were untrue and that 
the reference to “police” linked the untruths to him in his capacity 
as a supervisor of the police department.165 He was successful in his 
defamation claim in Alabama state court, but the decision was even-
tually reversed by the Supreme Court.166 
The Court reasoned that Alabama state law governing defama-
tion was constitutionally deficient in light of the First Amend-
ment.167 Alabama state law permitted a finding of defamation if the 
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words tended to injure the victim’s reputation and, where the victim 
was a public official, an untrue statement permitted a presumption 
of reputational harm.168 The Court found this burden on the public 
official plaintiff insufficiently low when compared with the goals of 
the First Amendment.169 The First Amendment, the Court reasoned, 
evinces a deep, national commitment to a robust discussion of mat-
ters of public concern.170 This commitment recognizes and allows 
for the possibility that untruths will seep into public discourse.171 
However, that possibility does not erode the protection afforded by 
the First Amendment for speech critical of public officials.172 
The First Amendment, the Court decided, places a high burden 
on a public official’s defamation lawsuit and proscribes unneces-
sarily strict burdens that might be placed on speakers.173 The First 
Amendment compels a public official to prove the statements were 
made with “actual malice” or “knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false . . . .”174 This high burden 
on public officials assures wide latitude for the governed who are 
critical of those who govern.175 Anything less could result in self-
censorship; those who might otherwise inveigh against public offi-
cials will steer clear of criticism that could contain even negligible 
errors for fear that misstatements will open them to liability.176 This 
would inhibit the “unfettered interchange of ideas” needed to bring 
about “political and social changes desired by the people.”177 
D. Government Action Motivated by Animus in Other 
Constitutional Contexts 
The viability of absolute immunity in defense of a malicious def-
amation allegation against a President is not informed simply by 
presidential immunity and defamation jurisprudence. Instead, it 
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must also be considered in light of the Supreme Court’s understand-
ing of the Constitution’s intolerance of maliciously motivated gov-
ernment actions.178 Indeed, the Supreme Court has opined on the 
constitutionality of malicious governmental motivations and has 
done so more recently than virtually all the cases discussed above.179 
In particular, though using malice’s synonym, the Court has found 
that government action motivated by animus violates the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution and are thus be-
yond the realm of constitutionally allowable government acts.180 
1. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE’S PROHIBITION ON 
GOVERNMENT ACTION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS 
In Romer v. Evans, the Court had occasion to consider whether 
a Colorado state constitutional amendment could survive an Equal 
Protection challenge where it was motivated by nothing more than 
animus.181 In Romer, multiple Colorado municipalities enacted or-
dinances that prohibited discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion.182 In response to these ordinances, Colorado adopted a consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting those and other antidiscrimination 
laws that singled out gays, lesbians, or bisexuals for protection from 
discrimination.183 The State posited that the constitutional amend-
ment simply placed gays and lesbians in the same position as others, 
providing no more and no less rights.184 
The Court found that argument unpersuasive.185 Instead, the 
Court interpreted the amendment as carving out only gays and les-
bians from the larger population and prohibiting laws that would 
otherwise protect them from discrimination.186 With the enactment 
of the amendment, the state and its municipalities would be incapa-
ble of including gays and lesbians in any enumerated list of classes 
of people specifically protected by antidiscrimination laws in either 
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public accommodations or from government action.187 Indeed, even 
adverse, arbitrary government action would go unchallenged if the 
basis for the action was a person’s status as a homosexual.188 The 
amendment, the Court found, did no more than single out and im-
pose a unique disability on gays and lesbians.189 
While laws routinely classify and benefit some classes of people 
over others, to be permissible under the Equal Protection Clause 
those laws must at least pass the minimum standard of scrutiny and 
“bear[] a rational relation to some legitimate end.”190 In this, the 
amendment failed.191 The Court reasoned gays and lesbians were 
targeted as a class to make it more difficult for them to seek aid from 
the government and protection from the law.192 Relatedly, the Court 
determined this objective was motivated by nothing more than ani-
mus for gays and lesbians.193 Because government action motivated 
by animus, or bare desire to harm, can never constitute a legitimate 
government interest, Colorado’s amendment could not survive a 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge.194 
2. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S PROHIBITION ON GOVERNMENT 
ACTION MOTIVATED BY ANIMUS 
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
the federal government from enacting legislation motivated by ani-
mus.195 In United States v. Windsor, the Court considered whether 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was constitutional in light of 
the Fifth Amendment.196 Because of moves by some states to permit 
same-sex marriage, the federal government enacted DOMA, an 
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amendment to the Dictionary Act, which redefined the word “mar-
riage” for the purposes of the federal legislation to mean “a legal 
union between one man and one woman.”197 When a widow did not 
qualify for the federal estate tax’s marital exemption because her 
deceased spouse was a woman, she filed suit challenging the consti-
tutionality of DOMA.198 The Court concluded that DOMA’s pur-
pose was to impose disabilities, and thus injury and indignity upon 
a class of people, thereby violating the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.199 
In reviewing the history of DOMA, the Court found the indig-
nity that resulted from the law was not an unintended byproduct, but 
“was its essence.”200 First, the mere fact that the federal government 
was weighing in on a subject often left to the states increased the 
unusual nature of DOMA.201 More importantly, Congress itself ar-
ticulated the intent that the law would demonstrate and inflict a 
moral rejection of state-sanctioned same-sex marriage.202 DOMA, 
the Court determined, served no other purpose than to impose ine-
quality, humiliate, and burden a class of people some states sought 
to protect.203 While the Government argued it was acting within its 
authority to articulate national policy, the Court noted that “[t]he 
power the Constitution grants it also restrains.”204 In particular, the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
limits malevolent government aims.205 The Amendment demarcates 
a border between constitutional, permissible government power and 
extra-constitutional, impermissible government power.206 It then 
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places the power to maliciously degrade and demean on the extra-
constitutional, impermissible side of the border.207 
III. IDENTIFYING THE “OUTER PERIMETER”: ACTUAL MALICE 
AND ANIMUS, TWO SIDES OF THE SAME CONSTITUTIONAL COIN 
Before beginning a discussion of how the Court’s constitutional 
understanding of maliciously motivated government action shapes 
the presidential immunity doctrine, it seems necessary to establish, 
in the first instance, that animus and malice are, at their core, related 
concepts. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “malice” as a “de-
sire to cause pain, injury, or distress to another . . .” while “animus” 
is defined as “a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or malevolent 
ill will . . . .”208 Black’s Law Dictionary states that “‘[m]alice,’ in its 
common acceptation, means ill will towards some person.”209 The-
saurus.com lists “animosity” as a relevant synonym for “malice.”210 
Whether one acts with “animus” or “malice” seems to connote the 
same motivation: acting with contemptuous malevolence and hos-
tility. As a result, the terms may be used interchangeably below be-
cause whether the animating intent behind government action is la-
beled “malice” or “animus” is a difference without a distinction. 
The Constitution, through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, draws a perimeter around the sovereign power of the state 
and the federal governments.211 First, the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause prohibits government from depriving a person’s lib-
erty by demeaning them for no other reason than animus.212 At the 
same time, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
similarly prohibits laws and government policies that have no legit-
imate purpose other than to classify a group of people and mali-
ciously inflict injury upon them for no other reason than enmity.213 
In exceeding these boundaries, government finds itself in a no man’s 
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land. It is beyond the limits of constitutionally permissible action. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ boundaries, however, can-
not be the only limitation on government action found in the Con-
stitution. These “animus” boundaries—boundaries that create a pe-
rimeter demarcating legitimate from illegitimate state interests, de-
marcating constitutionally protected and unprotected action—must 
exist elsewhere. 
Malicious defamation constitutes a defamatory statement where 
the speaker knows the statement to be untrue, or recklessly disre-
gards its truth.214 If a statement harms a victim’s reputation and the 
speaker knew the statement to be untrue, then the speaker must have 
been motivated by ill will, or animus, toward the victim.215 This be-
comes no less true if the President is the speaker. Indeed, if a Presi-
dent maliciously defames, it does not simply stand alone as a defam-
atory statement.216 It takes on the imprimatur of state action.217 As 
the head of state and in control of the executive power of the United 
States government, the President is the highest-ranking political 
leader. Thus, a President’s words are taken as an expression of the 
government’s intentions, interests, and goals.218 
Presidential immunity rests on the idea that the constitutional 
orientation of a President’s responsibilities requires him to act, and 
those actions should be as unencumbered as possible.219 Having to 
continuously review one’s actions in light of potential liability, the 
reasoning goes, will simply slow a President down and inhibit his 
ability to perform his duties.220 So long as a President is acting 
within the “outer perimeter” of those duties, absolute immunity 
serves the public good.221 This rationale and policy is arguably con-
vincing as it pertains to various situations in which a President may 
find himself. For example, whether it be a mundane, managerial de-
cision or a consequential, foreign policy decision, absolute immun-
ity frees a President to effectuate the executive branch’s responsibil-
ities. However, if a President maliciously defames, he transcends the 
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“outer perimeter” of his constitutional duties and finds himself be-
yond the legitimate functions of his office; he is in a no man’s 
land.222 Like the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments cabin govern-
ment action by requiring, at the least, government action not be mo-
tivated by animus,223 the general thrust of the Constitution and the 
First Amendment cabins the President’s official actions. 
As absolute sovereignty in the United States resides in the peo-
ple, and not the government, a President is in a position of limited 
powers.224 He holds only the powers granted through the Constitu-
tion, and, as discussed in Nixon above, his absolute immunity flows 
from his Article II powers.225 Unlike a single, king-like sovereign 
that retains unfettered power and thus the inherent authority to act 
without limitations, a President’s power cannot extend beyond the 
power the people of the United States—the sovereign—have relin-
quished to their government.226 While the people have clearly artic-
ulated enumerated powers in Article II that further the legitimate 
goals of a President’s constitutional role, a sovereign would not sur-
render the authority, and thus not grant a President absolute immun-
ity, to engage in actions that are motivated by nothing but mere an-
imus. 
More specifically, a sovereign would not grant power to a lim-
ited agent to engage in injurious actions motivated by malice or an-
imus. The exercise of this sort of power must be beyond the confines 
implicit in the allocation of a President’s Article II powers. Thus, if 
a President’s defamatory statements are motivated by malice, he 
transcends the “outer perimeter” of his Article II power.227 He finds 
himself in the same extra-constitutional no man’s land the govern-
ment finds itself in under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment when 
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its actions are motivated by nothing more than animus and en-
mity.228 Like the lack of constitutional authority to enact animus mo-
tivated laws in Romer and Windsor,229 a President’s maliciously de-
famatory speech would be illegitimate and thus, beyond the protec-
tion of absolute immunity. 
The relationship between sovereign and President is not the only 
source useful in identifying the “outer perimeter” of a President’s 
absolute immunity as it relates to malicious defamation.230 The same 
cabining of the President’s speech is also found in the First Amend-
ment.231 In Sullivan, the Court considered the question of how the 
First Amendment and defamation co-exist.232 In balancing the First 
Amendment’s robust commitment to open debate of matters of pub-
lic concern, and in particular of government officials, the Court an-
nounced the actual malice standard.233 Sullivan placed a constitu-
tionally mandated high burden on public officials to succeed in a 
defamation lawsuit.234 In doing so, the Court recognized that the de-
bate on matters of public concern needs room for errors and mis-
statements.235 Nevertheless, the Court also recognized that while 
good faith misstatements and misrepresentations inevitably occur in 
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this realm, morally culpable speech uttered in bad faith is still sub-
ject to legal censure.236 Thus, malicious defamation of a public offi-
cial, even in the face of the First Amendment’s commitments, may 
be proscribed.237 
While the Court in Barr held that maliciously motivated defa-
mation does not, ipso facto, exceed the boundaries of absolute im-
munity, the Court’s decisions in Romer and Windsor, in light of Sul-
livan, command otherwise.238 As discussed above, Romer and Wind-
sor invalidate government action when it is animated by nothing 
more than malevolence.239 These sorts of government policies are 
illegitimate in their genesis and beyond the boundaries that encom-
pass constitutional policy options available to the government. To 
be sure, these boundaries that demarcate permissible from imper-
missible government action under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments are in no way narrow.240 At a minimum, the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments simply require a government action be legiti-
mate and rational—an exceedingly generous parameter of op-
tions.241 
Likewise, Sullivan contemplates that however robust the First 
Amendment’s protections may be, however exceedingly generous 
the parameter of speech possibilities, maliciously motivated defa-
mation also transcends the constitutionally available options of pro-
tected speech.242 Initially, of course, defamation was never thought 
to be protected speech,243 and a question existed as to whether sedi-
tious libel was unprotected speech.244 Nonetheless, Sullivan extends 
the protective boundaries of the First Amendment and brings some 
defamatory untruths into its fold.245 But it stops short of bringing 
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malicious defamation within the boundaries of speech protected by 
the First Amendment.246 
Thus, when taken together, Romer, Windsor, and Sullivan delin-
eate one “outer perimeter” for presidential absolute immunity—ma-
licious defamation.247 The boundaries of speech encompassed by 
presidential absolute immunity are no doubt expansive, like the 
boundaries laid out by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.248 
However, when the President’s speech is defamatory and motivated 
by nothing more than bad faith and malice, it is as equally illegiti-
mate as the government action in Romer and Windsor;249 its genesis 
dooms its absolute immunity protection from the start. Just as the 
Sullivan Court stopped short of extending the First Amendment’s 
protection to encompass malicious defamation,250 the absolute im-
munity provided to presidential speech must bump up against a 
boundary that expects no more than the Constitution expects in other 
circumstances: that government actions, whether legislative policy 
or presidential speech, not be motivated simply by malice. 
To be sure, it is of no concern whether a President speaks within 
his capacity as President or in his personal capacity. While a Presi-
dent might speak on a matter traditionally within his purview, it is 
no more entitled to absolute immunity if it is maliciously defama-
tory. In Romer, the amendment was brought about by a plebiscite: 
the direct expression of the will of the people to govern themselves 
and within the traditional power of a democratic system.251 In Romer 
and Windsor, the laws would have regulated an area that is generally 
and typically within the government’s usual legislative authority.252 
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Nevertheless, these government actions, because they were moti-
vated by animus, exceeded the constitutional periphery of govern-
ment power established by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.253 
Likewise, while a President may be speaking on a topic that is oth-
erwise well within his official capacity, malicious defamatory 
speech exceeds the outer perimeter of official actions—in this case, 
speech—available to a President. At that point, a President leaves 
behind the absolute immunity that shields his actions within the pe-
rimeter. 
As the Court noted in Barr, Nixon, and Clinton, presidential ab-
solute immunity is a judicial construct and necessarily requires a 
balancing of interests.254 Specifically, with regard to defamation, the 
Court in Barr suggested that those interests are, on the one hand, the 
defamation victim obtaining redress, and, on the other hand, freeing 
the government official to act.255 But, as Chief Justice Warren’s dis-
sent in Barr notes, there is yet another interest of equal import: the 
chilling nature of absolute immunity for malicious defamation.256 In 
the context of malicious defamation and absolute immunity, the 
First Amendment and Article II are in conflict.257 In that conflict, 
the First Amendment seeks to give the widest possible latitude to 
citizens to criticize a government official, including the President. 
Article II, Nixon holds, necessitates a sphere of absolute immunity 
within which a President can operate.258 
The First Amendment’s protection, however, is not extended to 
malicious defamation by a President.259 That speech is unprotected. 
If a President’s malicious defamation is protected by absolute im-
munity, a situation arises where one party can sue for defamation 
and one cannot. With the visibility of the office, “it will take a brave 
person to criticize [the President] knowing that in reply [the Presi-
dent] may libel [his critic] with immunity . . . .”260 This becomes 
even more chilling if a President has a penchant for litigiousness 
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and, in particular, defamation lawsuits.261 Placing malicious defa-
mation beyond the outer perimeter of legitimate presidential acts, 
and thus beyond the protection of absolute immunity, safeguards the 
First Amendment’s commitment to ensuring the freedom to criticize 
our representatives, even the President. 
The need for a distinction between absolutely immune defama-
tion and defamation which falls outside the immunity sphere is only 
more evident and essential in light of social media platforms like 
Twitter. Twitter facilitates, if not encourages, unrestrained, visceral 
expression.262 Human experience has always allowed for this sort of 
communication, and the First Amendment undoubtedly and rightly 
protects it; yet, human experience has also encouraged a tempering 
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of the most destructive, harmful speech. Social cues, personal inter-
action, and time for reflection can serve as a moderating force. A 
lack of these moderating forces, coupled with the inclination toward 
uninhibited self-disclosure of otherwise private thoughts, as is found 
on platforms like Twitter, facilitates a liberation of harmful speech. 
This liberation in the hands of a President, if entitled to absolute 
immunity, can only exacerbate the negative aspects of communi-
cating via Twitter, including the harm it can cause. 
Notably, when the Court considered the absolute immunity doc-
trine in Barr, the defendant’s allegedly defamatory speech was com-
municated in a press release.263 Press releases and similar mediums 
for government speech provide the opportunity to contemplate, re-
flect on, and choose one’s words before communicating. To be sure, 
communicating through a press release, or any official statement, 
does not preclude the risk that defamation will occur. Moreover, 
public officials are often called upon to engage in extemporaneous 
speech, and this sort of communication can be valuable; it often pro-
vides a more nuanced understanding of their ideas. However, the 
sort of unbridled spontaneous communication unleashed by Twitter 
and similar social media platforms significantly increases the likeli-
hood that government communication will contain harmful inaccu-
racies.264 These harms become more damaging in the hands of a 
President because of both the prominence of his social media pres-
ence and effects of his words on numerous people.265 
Excluding malicious defamation from the absolute immunity 
sphere may certainly result in a President hesitating before turning 
to social media to communicate with the public. However, viewing 
absolute immunity for what it is—a judicial construct motivated by 
public policy determinations—this hesitation will encourage and in-
crease contemplative communication. Thoughtful, deliberate com-
munication then decreases the prospect that a President will propa-
gate communication motivated by nothing more than animus. Per-
haps in 1959, when Barr was decided and press conferences were 
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the platform of the day,266 the need for encouraging measured com-
munication was less crucial. Nevertheless, with Twitter and instan-
taneous uninhibited communication becoming the norm, an inter-
pretation of absolute immunity that results in reflection and avoiding 
speech motivated by animus encourages a President to act within the 
realm of constitutionally permissible government action. 
CONCLUSION 
Twitter and similar social media platforms have ushered in a 
new way to communicate instantaneously, often in unadulterated 
terms.267 Unadulterated speech, however, can be a breeding ground 
for defamation. This is no less the case when Twitter is used as a 
means for a President of the United States to communicate. While a 
President’s immunity from liability is no doubt expansive, it is not 
unlimited.268 Undoubtedly, a President is entitled to absolute im-
munity for acts within the “outer perimeter” of his official duties.269 
However, if a President’s defamatory speech is motived by nothing 
more than malice, he transcends that perimeter. When considering 
the Constitution’s prohibition on government actions motivated by 
animus,270 as well as the First Amendment’s exceedingly protective 
boundaries that nevertheless stop short of protecting malicious def-
amation,271 it becomes clear that presidential immunity does not ap-
ply to malicious defamation claims. The Constitution neither toler-
ates nor protects government actions, including speech, when they 
are motivated by #malice or #animus,272 even if tweeted by 
@POTUS. 
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